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Abstract
Existing literature suggests that an individual’s socioeconomic status 
may have a considerable effect on their tendency to engage in financially 
risky behaviors. More specifically, studies have demonstrated that victims 
of inequality, that is, people of low socioeconomic status or whose finan-
cial disadvantage is salient, have an increased propensity to make risky 
monetary decisions. This notion, however, does not apply to all cases of 
economic inequality, but rather depends on the process through which 
income is acquired. Thus, this research attempts to challenge the current 
notion by varying the fairness of the process through which income is 
earned or given, attempting to more accurately simulate the earning of 
income in the real world. I hypothesize that using a “fairer” process to 
determine monetary distribution will curtail the risky behaviors suppos-
edly caused by economic inequality, as opposed to a random or arbitrary 
(unfair) process. I also seek to determine if perceived procedural fairness 
can influence one’s willingness to take financial risks. In situations of 
inequality, I find no considerable effect of distribution fairness on subse-
quent levels of risk involved in making financial decisions. 
Introduction 
It seems intuitive that people of lower socioeconomic status would gener-
ally be more prudent when it comes to spending or investing their income. 
However, numerous studies have suggested that gaps in income distribu-
tion can actually cause individuals to engage in riskier financial behavior 
relative to their wealthier counterparts.  For example, a study by Mishra 
et al. (2015) demonstrated that “victims” of inequality, when aware of the 
financial disparity between themselves and others, have a greater ten-
dency to choose risky bets over definite earnings when given the option. 
Moreover, Mishra et al. (2015) found that ameliorating this financial 
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disparity by eliminating income gaps between subjects correlated with a 
reduction in observed risky behavior. That is, when victims of inequality 
were put in equal financial standing with their wealthier counterparts, 
they were less likely to make risky financial decisions. Research by Payne 
et al. (2016) bolsters these findings, also concluding that people tend 
to choose risky gambles in conditions of inequality where they are not 
the beneficiary. Kuziemko et al. (2011) take this notion a step further, 
formulating a theory of “last place aversion” in which people suffering 
the largest losses from inequality in a given group will gravitate toward 
riskier options over definite earnings. 
In an attempt to provide an explanation for this phenomenon, Payne 
et al. (2016) posit that victims of inequality tend to make upward social 
comparisons. Desiring to close the income gap, they are thus more willing 
to choose risky financial decisions that may result in larger payouts over 
definite, but smaller, profits. In the case of Kuziemko et al., people will 
choose riskier options in order to maintain their current social status 
(avoid falling into last place) or to move up in ranking (attempting to 
move out of last place). However, on-going research by Einav Hart and 
Paul Piff suggest that the “fairness” of the monetary allocation procedure 
can influence how people make financial decisions. Here, a “fair” process 
is one which operates on an objective measure of judgement. That is, 
“fairness” consists in determining monetary allocations via a procedure 
which evaluates people with regard to some objective test. Conversely, an 
“unfair” process involves a subjective or random metric. In other words, 
“unfairness” utilizes no objective basis for evaluation. In the studies 
mentioned above, the process by which inequality was implemented was 
completely arbitrary, determined at random by the researcher at the time 
of the study. In our terms, we would judge this distribution process as 
unfair. For example, of 2 participants arriving for a study, one would ran-
domly be chosen to be the beneficiary of inequality, receiving $10 while 
the other received nothing. 
Our study seeks to determine if varying the fairness of the allocation pro-
cedure can influence individuals’ tendency to choose risky over safe bets. 
More specifically, findings by Hart and Piff suggest that a fair allocation 
process encourages mindful decision making, and that “inequalities per-
ceived as fair can promote cooperation and trust.” Furthermore, a study 
by Hoffman et al. (1994) suggests that people tend to be less willing to 
let go of money that they have had to work for, as opposed to money that 
is simply allocated to them. Thus, based on this finding and the notion 
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that fairness can yield positive effects on individual decision making, we 
hypothesize that a fairer allocation procedure will moderate the observed 
risky behavior otherwise caused by financial inequality.
Method
Participants consisted of 197 individuals recruited using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, and they completed our survey and experimental tasks 
online. The survey was advertised with a standardized monetary payment 
($0.40) and offered the potential to earn additional money. Participants 
were purportedly placed in a group with two other “subjects,” against 
whom they would be compared for the duration of the study. They were 
then randomly assigned to one of four possible conditions in which equal-
ity and fairness were manipulated.
In each condition, participants would respond to a questionnaire and then 
make a series of financial decisions intended to help us measure levels of 
risk.
Condition Description
Fair + Equal Fair allocation procedure, financial equality
Fair + Unequal Fair allocation procedure, financial inequality
Unfair + Equal Unfair allocation procedure, financial equality
Unfair + Unequal Unfair allocation procedure, financial inequality
Table 1. Levels of fairness and inequality in each condition
Procedure
Participants completing the task were told that they would be paired with 
two other people who would constitute their group for the duration of the 
study. This was not true, however, as participants were merely shown 
a predetermined set of fictitious subjects against whom they would be 
compared. They were then shown one of two possible questionnaires: 
either a preference questionnaire or a trivia questionnaire. Participants 
were told that they would receive a payment based on their answers to the 
questions presented, and they would also see the payments received by 
the other two members of their group. The preference questionnaire con-
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stituted the “unfair” process, as it consisted of questions such as “what is 
your favorite genre of movie” and contained no objective metric for eval-
uation. In other words, these questions had no right or wrong answers, 
but were answered strictly according to the participants’ preferences. 
The trivia questionnaire constituted the “fair” process and consisted of 
knowledge-based questions. We defined this to be the “fair” process, as 
there were objectively correct answers to the questions being asked, and 
therefore an objective metric for evaluation and ranking. In order to check 
the fairness manipulation, participants were also asked to rate the fair-
ness of the procedure used to determine the payment before the equality 
manipulation. They rated the procedure on a 9-point scale, with 1 being 
the least fair and 9 being the most.
Regardless of participants’ performance on the questionnaire task, par-
ticipants were randomly allocated to either an equal or unequal condition. 
In the equal condition, participants were allocated the same payment as 
the other two group members, each receiving $0.28. In the unequal con-
dition, participants received the least amount ($0.28) of money relative to 
their group members ($0.63 and $0.89). We then assessed participants’ 
risk preferences. Participants were presented with six choice pairs and 
were told that one of their choices would be randomly selected at the end 
of the study and that they would receive any payoff associated with their 
decision. The choice pairs are shown in Table 2. 
Guaranteed Risky
100% probability of receiving 
$0.24
OR 80% probability of receiv-
ing $0.30
100% probability of receiving 
$0.24
OR 60% probability of receiving 
$0.40
100% probability of receiving 
$0.24
OR 40% probability of receiv-
ing $0.60
100% probability of receiving 
$0.24
OR 30% probability of receiving 
$0.80
100% probability of receiving 
$0.24
OR 20% probability of receiving 
$1.20
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100% probability of receiving 
$0.24
OR 10% probability of receiving 
$2.40
Table 2. The six choice pairs presented to each participant. Participants 
were asked to choose which they would most prefer.
Each pair consisted of one “Guaranteed” option which offered a 100% 
chance of receiving $0.24, and one “Risky” option which offered an X% 
chance of receiving some amount greater than the Guaranteed alterna-
tive. Risky gambles were chosen such that the expected value of each was 
the same as the guaranteed amount. Choice pairs were presented one at a 
time and in the order shown in Table 2. 
There are several ways that one could potentially characterize “risky 
behavior.” For our purposes, we assessed “risky financial behavior” in 
three ways: 1. Participants choosing the risky option in at least one of the 
choice pairs. 2. Participants choosing the risky option in at least three 
(half) of the choice pairs. 3. Participants choosing any risky gamble with 
probability less than 50% (in other words, choosing any one of the four 
riskiest gambles). We evaluated levels of risk based on these individ-
ual definitions of “risky behavior,” as well as recorded how many risky 
options were chosen by participants in each condition. 
Results
In a two-sample t-test, we found that participants in the fair (trivia) 
condition rated the allocation procedure as fairer on average (5.72) than 
participants in the unfair (preference) condition (5.09), with t(197)= 
-2.06, p = 0.041. Thus, this difference is significant, confirming that the 
trivia questionnaire with an objective metric of judgement was also per-
ceived as fairer by participants (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Average participant ratings of procedural fairness and control 
over outcomes in preference vs. trivia conditions
Moreover, participants in the trivia condition also reported feeling like 
they had much more control over the outcome and their subsequent payoff
on average (4.4) than participants in the preference condition (3.0) with 
t(197)= -4, P = .0001 (participants rated control on the same 9-point scale 
whichthey used to rate fairness).
On average, the number of risky gambles chosen by participants in any 
condition ranged between 1.7-2 out of the total six gambles presented. 
We used a binary indicator to express how often participants chose at least 
one of the risky gambles, with values equal to 0 if no risky options were 
chosen, and equal to 1 if at least one risky gamble was chosen (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Values represent the percentage of people who choose at least 
one risky gamble in each condition
We also tested whether the inequality and fairness manipulations influ-
enced participants’ subsequent financial decisions using an ANOVA test 
on two of the dependent variables; how many risky options were chosen 
and whether a risky option was chosen at all (same as the binary indica-
tor described above, noting whether at least one of the risky options was 
chosen). We included participants’ subjective fairness rating in the anal-
yses to assess whether perceived fairness could have the same or similar 
effect of objective fairness. Though a process may be objectively fair, we 
wanted to determine if perceived fairness could also be influential. There 
was no significant effect of either the inequality (F(1,197)=.11, P = .74) 
or fairness (F(1,197)=.01, P = .94) manipulations on the total number 
of risky options chosen by each participant, nor was there a significant 
interaction effect, F(1,197)=1.16 and P = .28 (Table 2). Results were similar 
regarding the effects inequality, fairness, and their interaction on whether 
a risky gamble was chosen at all. However, participants’ perceived fair-
ness of the allocation procedure seemed to have an effect on whether a 
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risky gamble would be chosen, with F(8,197)=2.11 and P = .04 (Table 3). 
Yet, no other significant effects were observed. 
Finally, a contrast test was used to compare the effects of each inde-
pendent variable (namely the fairness manipulation and the inequality 
manipulation) on the levels of the other. The inequality manipulation had 
no significant effect on either the total number of risky gambles chosen 
(F=.66, P=.5) or on whether a risky gamble was chosen at all (F=1.01, 
P=.37) for both levels of the fairness manipulation. Similarly, the fairness 
manipulation had no significant effect on whether a risky gamble was 
chosen (F=.83, P=.43) or the total number of risky gambles chosen (F=.58, 
P=.6).
Discussion
The results of this study suggest that the fairness of the procedure used to 
distribute income does not influence the level of risk involved in subse-
quent financial decisions made with that income. However, it is important 
to note that this research bolsters the notion offered by Hart and Piff that 
individuals do indeed perceive more objective measures of judgement as 
Table 3. Main and interaction effects of dependent variables on whether 
a risky gamble is chosen 
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fairer than subjective, arbitrary measures. Perhaps, the amounts of money 
allocated to participants in this case was too low to elicit any potential 
effects of procedural fairness on financial risk-taking. It could be that 
larger amounts of income entailing greater or more enduring financial 
consequences, in conjunction with inequality and procedural fairness, 
is what is needed to more accurately simulate real-world earning and 
distribution of wealth and yield the outcomes hypothesized in this paper. 
This was one key distinction between our study and the research cited 
here; the initial allocation and potential gains or losses entailed by the 
risky gambles in our study were much lower. Future studies may attempt 
to replicate the process we have used, but increase the initial allocation, as 
well as the potential monetary loss or gain, in an effort to determine if the 
magnitude of potential gains and losses, in conjunction with inequality, 
produces different results. 
Finally, though this study failed to uncover any connection between pro-
cedural fairness and risky financial behavior, there nevertheless seems to 
be a methodological problem with studies whose monetary allocation is 
determined completely at random. As previously stated, Hoffman et al. 
(1994) found that people tend to be much more conservative with money 
that they had to work for, as opposed to money that was simply given to 
them. Intuitively, we might reasonably assume that this would also entail 
safer financial behavior, rather than increased risk-taking. Thus, future 
studies may also seek to determine if financial risk-taking in conditions 
of inequality can be curtailed by effort on the part of the recipient who has 
to work to earn the money being allocated to them.
References
Hoffman, E., Mccabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994). “Preferences, 
Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and 
Economic Behavior, 7(3), 346-380. doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056
Kuziemko, I., Buell, R., Reich, T., & Norton, M. (2011). “Last-place 
Aversion.” Evidence and Redistributive Implications. doi:10.3386/w17234
David Herrera
  Volume 14 | Spring 2019         49
Mishra, S., Hing, L. S., & Lalumière, M. L. (2015). “Inequality and Risk-Tak-
ing.” Evolutionary Psychology, 13(3). doi:10.1177/1474704915596295
Payne, K., Brown-Iannuzzi, J., & Hannay, J. (2017). “Economic inequality 
increases risk taking.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States, 114(18). Retrieved November 23, 2017.
Inequality, Fairness and Risk
